IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

In re Patent Application of:

APPLICANTS: Dan Boneh, Richard DeMillo, Richard Lipton

SERIAL NO. 09/516,910

FILED: March 1, 2000

GROUP ART   2766

TITLE: A Method of Using Transient Faults to Verify the Security of a Cryptosystem

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
WASHINGTON, D.C.   20231

SIR:

Preliminary Amendment

Prior to examination of the above-identified application, which is a continuation of Serial No. 08/933,541, filed September 19,1997, please amend said application as follows:

In The Specification

Page 3, line 23, after "key", delete "e_i" and insert -- e_j --.

Page 4, line 2, before "mod", delete "e_i" and insert -- e_j --.

Page 5, line 8, before "s_i", delete "$\Pi_{i \in 9s}$" and insert -- $\Pi_{i \in s}$ --.

Page 8, line 4, after "cryptosystems", delete "using" and insert -- which uses --.

Page 18, line 17, after "not", delete "devisable" and insert -- divisible --.

Page 39, line 18, after "cryptosystems", delete "are" and insert -- and --.

In the Claims

Cancel claims 1 through 39 and add the following claims 40 through 53.

40. A method for determining secret information contained in a first cryptography device using a second cryptography device, the method comprising the steps of:

    a. generating an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a correct digital signature in said first cryptography device;

    b. transmitting the electrical signal containing the correct digital signature to said second cryptography device;

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c. placing said first cryptography device under physical stress and in response to the physical stress, generating an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing an incorrect digital signature in said first cryptography device;

10   d. transmitting the electrical signal containing the incorrect digital signature to said second cryptography device;

e. in a processor in said second cryptographic device, determining secret information q stored in said first cryptography device using:

$$gcd(E-\hat{E},N) = q$$

15   wherein N is a product of prime numbers, and one of the prime numbers is q; and

f. generating an output electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing the secret information used to generate the correct signature.

41. The method of claim 40 wherein said first cryptographic device generates a digital signature which may be separated into linear components.

20   42. The method of claim 40 wherein placing said first cryptography device under physical stress includes at least one of applying atypical voltage levels, applying a higher speed than said first cryptography device was designed to accommodate, or applying radiation.

43. A method for determining secret information contained in a first cryptography device using a second cryptography device, the method comprising the steps of:

25   a. in said first cryptography device, generating an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a first authentication value of form r^2 mod N wherein r is a random number and N is a secret value which is a product of prime numbers and transmitting said electrical signal containing the authentication value to said second cryptography device;

b. in said second cryptography device, generating an electrical signal comprising a

30   stream of bits containing a subset of integers S and transmitting said electrical signal containing the subset of integers to said first cryptography device;

c. in response to receipt of the electrical signal containing the subset of integers, generating in said first cryptography device an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a second authentication value of form $\hat{y} = (r + \acute{E}) \Pi_{i\in s} s_i$ wherein $\hat{y}$ is an erroneous

35   value, s_i is a secret exponent used to encrypt, and $\acute{E}$ is a value added to r due to an error and transmitting said second authentication value to said second cryptography device;

d. in response to receipt of the electrical signal containing the second authentication value, determining in a processor of said second cryptography device a value for $\acute{E}$ by

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computing:

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$$\left(r + \acute{E}\right)^2 = \frac{\hat{y}^2}{\prod_{i \in s} v_i} \left(\mathrm{mod}\, N\right)$$

wherein $v_i = s_i^2$;

      f. determining in the processor of said second cryptography device a value of r by computing:

$$\left(r + \acute{E}\right)^2 - r^2 = 2\acute{E}r + \acute{E}^2 \left(\mathrm{mod}\, N\right) \; ;$$

45   g. in response to the calculated values of $\acute{E}$ and r, determining in the processor of said second cryptography device a value for s_i by computing:

$$\prod_{i \in s} s_i = \frac{\hat{y}}{r + \acute{E}} \left(\mathrm{mod}\, N\right); \text{ and}$$

      h. generating an output electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing secret information $\prod_{i \in s} s_i$.

50   44. The method of claim 43 wherein the step of determining s_i further includes the step of computing in the processor in said second cryptography device:

$$\prod_{i \in s} s_i = \frac{2\acute{E}\,\hat{y}}{\dfrac{\hat{y}^2}{\prod_{i \in s} v_i} - r^2 + \acute{E}^2} \left(\mathrm{mod}\, N\right).$$

    45. The method of claim 43 further comprising the step of determining in the processor in

55   said second cryptography device whether the value of $\acute{E}$ satisfies the relation $\left(y'\right) = \left(r'\right)^2 T^2$ by using the subset of integers S; wherein T is a guessed value for $\prod_{i \in s} s_i$.

    46. The method of claim 43 wherein the step of generating the electrical signal comprising a subset of integers S in said second cryptography device includes generating a plurality of subsets of S.

60   47. The method of claim 46 wherein the step of generating in said first cryptography device an electrical signal comprising a second authentication value in response to receipt of the signal containing the plurality of subset of S further includes generating a second authentication value for each subset S of the plurality of subsets S received.

    48. The method of claim 47 wherein the step of generating a plurality of subsets S in said

65   second cryptography device further comprises generating singleton sets.

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49.   A method for determining secret information contained in a first cryptography device using a second cryptography device, the method comprising the steps of:

   a.   placing said first cryptography device under physical stress and in response to the physical stress, generating an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing an

70   incorrect digital signature in said first cryptography device;

   b.   transmitting the electrical signal containing the incorrect digital signature to said second cryptography device;

   c.   in response to receipt of the electrical signal containing the incorrect digital signature, selecting a block length in a processor of said second cryptography device;

75   d.   determining in the processor of said second cryptography device a candidate vector w that matches all known bits of the secret information and is zero elsewhere by computing:

$$w = \sum_{y=k_i}^{n} s_j 2^j + \sum_{j=k_i-r}^{k_i-1} u_j 2^j$$

wherein k_i is a time at which an error may have occurred; s_j is a bit which may be incorrect; r is

80   a possible blocklength; and u is a bit which may be incorrect;

   e.   determining in the processor of said second cryptography device whether candidate vector w is correct by computing:

$$\exists e \in \{0,...,n\} s.t. \left(\hat{E}_j \pm 2^e m_j^w \right)^{ei} = m_j (\text{mod } N)$$

wherein   e = a public exponent;

85   n = a number of bits in the secret information;

   m_j = a message;

   e_j = a public signature verification exponent; and

   N = a product of prime numbers;

   f.   if the candidate vector w is correct, generating an output electrical signal

90   comprising a stream of bits containing a value for the selected block length; and

   g.   if the candidate vector w is incorrect, determining in the processor of said second cryptography device another candidate vector.

50.   The method of claim 49 wherein the steps (c) – (f) are performed for a plurality of block lengths.

95   51.   A method for determining secret information contained in a first cryptography device using a second cryptography device, the method comprising the steps of:

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a. generating in said second cryptography device an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a challenge t and transmitting the electrical signal containing the challenge to said first cryptography device;

100   b. in response to receipt of the electrical signal containing the challenge t, generating in said first cryptography device an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a response of form $u = r + ts \bmod p$, wherein:

r is a random number selected by the first cryptography device;

s is the first cryptography device's secret key; and

105   p is a large prime number;

c. transmitting the electrical signal containing a response to said second cryptography device;

d. transmitting the electrical signal containing the same challenge t to said first cryptography device;

110   e. in response to receipt of the electrical signal containing the challenge t, generating in said first cryptography device an electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing a second response of form $\hat{u} = \hat{r} + x \bmod p$, wherein:

$\hat{r}$ is an erroneous value of r and x is $ts \bmod p$;

f. in response to receipt of electrical signal containing the second response,

115   determining in said second cryptography device a location of the error; and

g. generating an output electrical signal comprising a stream of bits containing the secret integer s_i.

52. The method of claim 51 wherein the step of determining the location of the error further comprises the steps of trying all possible locations of the error.

120   53. The method of claim 52 wherein the step of trying all possible locations further includes the step of determining in said second cryptography device which location for the error satisfies:

$$g^{\hat{u}} = g^{2i} g^{r} g^{x} (\bmod\, p)$$

wherein:

125   g is a generator of Z_p^*; and

i is a location of the error.

GP2766

AMENDMENT TRANSMITTAL LETTER (Large Entity)

Applicant(s):   D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton

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TO THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS:

Transmitted herewith is an amendment in the above-identified application.

The fee has been calculated and is transmitted as shown below.

CLAIMS AS AMENDED

	CLAIMS REMAINING AFTER AMENDMENT	HIGHEST # PREV. PAID FOR	NUMBER EXTRA CLAIMS PRESENT	RATE	ADDITIONAL FEE
TOTAL CLAIMS	14 -	39 =	0	x $18.00	$0.00
INDEP. CLAIMS	4 -	7 =	0	x $78.00	$0.00
Multiple Dependent Claims (check if applicable) ☐					$0.00
TOTAL ADDITIONAL FEE FOR THIS AMENDMENT					$0.00

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Signature

Dated: April 25, 2000

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